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Executive summary 
 
In the last years, PSO has noticed that a number of Northern NGOs (NNGOs) have established 
field presence in the South, guided by the conviction that proximity to the target groups and the 
partners in the South would make their organisations more efficient and effective. However, there 
are also some negative views on the move, which has even been referred to as a new form of neo-
colonialism. The strengthening of civil society is a priority for PSO and its member organisations and 
has motivated the present report. 
“Field presence” is defined as keeping field offices with a building and an administrative structure 
and/or permanent officers at the site of the projects (consultants and advisors in the field for a short 
time are thus excluded). A distinction is made between operational NGOs, doing mostly 
humanitarian work and post-conflict rehabilitation through field offices and officers, and those doing 
structural development work, usually through local partners.  
A total of 29 PSO members have taken part in this report. Unless expressly clarified, they reflect the 
views of their organisations rather than their own personal opinions. The organisations were selected 
by PSO: all member organisations with some kind of field presence were invited to participate, as 
well as some organisations without field presence. Two experts were interviewed: Chiku Malunga in 
Malawi and Alan Fowler in South Africa.  
The motivation and impact of field presence of Dutch NGOs in the South was analysed from four 
angles. First, the trend towards the structural decentralisation of development organisations, defined 
as the transfer of responsibilities and authorities to lower levels of the organisation (Fowler, 1992). 
Decentralisation admits three levels: deconcentration (transfer of responsibilities but not authorities), 
delegation (transfer of both to lower levels) and devolution (transfer of both to local autonomous 
agents). The second line is the analysis of changes in the international aid chain generated by the 
establishment of field presence of Dutch NGOs in the South, drawing from Biekart (1999). The 
third line is the tension between institutional and developmental imperatives facing NGOs and 
outlined by Edwards (1996). The former are the priorities that the agency thinks it has to take to 
survive and the later are what it should be doing to fulfil its mission statement. Finally, the fourth line 
of analysis is the five capabilities on which systemic capacity rests, according to the ECDPM 
approach conceptualised by Morgan (2006): the capability to act, to generate development results, to 
relate, to adapt and self-renew, and to achieve coherence. 
The report categorised the Dutch NGOs that participated in the study into five groups, according to 
their actions and visions in terms of field presence. The decision of whether to have field presence in 
the South lies at the heart of the tension between institutional and developmental imperatives. Like 
all categorisations the one presented contains some degree of arbitrariness. Some organisations use 
various structures for different types of work and their categorisation responded to the main 
modality.  
The first category is the group of NGOs that neither have nor wish to have field offices in the South, 
either because they find it unnecessary or as a matter of principle. They are neither convinced of the 
gains in efficiency nor the improvement in information gathering that are attributed to field presence. 
They contend that it has a negative impact on the capacity building of civil society actors in the 
South, though they also admit they may be losing funding opportunities. They are therefore giving 
priority to development imperatives at the expense of institutional imperatives.  
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The second one is formed by NGOs with field presence. Presence in the South is sometimes 
explained by the specificity of the work they do in capacity building and post-conflict rehabilitation 
or by the conviction that a decentralised structure will improve the work of the organisation. These 
NGOs emphasise that field presence makes their work more efficient and effective and it lets them 
access better information and funding opportunities. However, they also admit that field presence 
may be disempowering civil society actors in the South. To avoid it, some are furthering the 
decentralisation of their structures into delegation and refrain from applying for funding or 
intervening in areas where SNGOs are present. They thus give priority to the institutional 
imperatives above the developmental ones but with various degrees of efforts to achieve a balance 
between the two.  
The third group is composed by relatively smaller Dutch NGOs that keep long-term partnerships 
with a horizontal network of more or less independent NGOs in the South and sometimes in the 
North. They give limited funding and are active at a low scale. The members stick to the network of 
organisation by agreement and mostly place high relevance on the joint accumulation of knowledge. 
This seems an optimal method of empowerment for the civil society actors in the South under 
certain conditions. The Dutch NGO should not be too dominant or else the SNGOs are unable to 
develop its capacities. There are also some doubts regarding to what point this model is replicable at 
a larger scale (i.e. a larger organisation) and/or in places the minimum capacities are not readily 
available in the South.  
The fourth group is formed by Dutch NGOs that form part of large global organisations working on 
most areas of development, from humanitarian to structural poverty alleviation. Humanitarian work 
in their various forms (emergency aid, post-conflict rehabilitation, etc) almost always places NNGOs 
in the field. Some of these NNGOs give more autonomy to their field offices and partners in the 
South than others, but in general institutional imperatives seem to take priority over development 
imperatives, at least in relation to long-term development work. There is little evidence of change in 
a different direction.  
The fifth category is formed by only one NGO that integrates a global organisation started in the 
South, with headquarters in the South and partners in the South. This is an unusual case of growth 
and empowerment among SNGOs moving North, in opposite direction as the other organisations 
interviewed. It represents a further modification of the international aid chain which may become 
more common in the future. 
What is the motivation for field presence of NNGOs in the South? There seems to be a wide 
consensus that direct field presence is necessary for humanitarian relief work because it makes 
responses faster, more effective and legitimate. However, critics of field presence consider that 
capacity building needs to be given priority as soon as possible and for this it is often convenient to 
foresee an exit scenario in the medium term (2-3 years). 
In relation to structural poverty alleviation and long-term development, opinions are more divided. 
Those NNGOs with field presence assure that it generates gains in efficiency: organisations become 
more cost-effective, increase access to funding opportunities and improve their information 
gathering. Critics of field presence argue that efficiency gains and information gathering are not 
straightforward but do admit that field presence improves funding opportunities. All in all, the 
motivation for field presence is related to the internal needs and pressures of the NNGOs and their 
donors -the institutional imperatives rather than the developmental imperatives-. Extra funding, 
reporting on measurable and quick results, avoiding mistakes and proving effectiveness fall on the 
side of institutional imperatives.  
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What are the effects on civil society actors in the South? Dutch NGOs see both positive and 
negative effects of field presence on civil societies in the South. On the positive side, arguments 
again concentrate on effectiveness: field presence can become a catalyst for capacity building and 
reduce a lengthy learning process. A partnership with a NNGO gives SNGOs access to networks in 
which they normally do not participate and provides a role model in terms of organisational 
capacities. However, in view of past experience, it begs the question of whether taking shortcuts is 
actually possible in development processes. On the negative side, the presence of NNGOs in the 
South reduces the central role of SNGOs in their own field, depressing the need for local civil 
society actors to organise themselves, to grow and to push for social change. It also represents extra 
competition for funding and development intervention. There are risks that field offices and officers 
may distort needs’ identification, pose excessive control and interference on the work of SNGOs and 
reinforcing the perceptions of inequality.  
Some Dutch NGOs emphasised that they only hire local staff in their field offices to improve their 
local embeddedness. However, this provokes a drain of qualified human resources from local NGOs 
that cannot compete in terms of wages and working conditions. So far, none of the interviewed 
organisations has found a solution to that problem. 
The positive and negative effects for civil society actors in the South make the decision on field 
presence a difficult one. The positive effects in terms of institutional imperatives only appear when 
worked out deliberately and while the negative impacts can be dampened. All in all, the crucial point 
is not whether to establish field presence in the South or not, but rather what those offices or 
officers would be doing. If what they do is mainly supporting SNGOs from a distance and without 
tampering their independence, then there will be more positive than negative effects for the civil 
society actors in the South.  
The question thus needs to be rephrased: under what conditions does field presence lead to both 
gains in efficiency for NNGOs and in capacity building among the civil society actors in the South? 
How can the organisational decentralisation of Dutch NGOs be turned into a win-win situation for 
both? Good starting points are transferring as many decision powers as possible to local partners, 
avoiding an overburden of controls and interference by field offices, refraining from applying for 
funds where SNGOs are present and pre-defining a time span for field presence. Power asymmetries 
between field representatives of NNGOs and the local SNGO partners is inevitable but can be 
constrained by limiting numerical presence (i.e. keeping minimal personnel in the field office), 
transferring decision-making powers over the use of funds and keeping similar wage levels. All in all, 
it means not taking actions in line with the institutional imperatives alone but considering the 
development imperatives as well. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last years, PSO has noticed that a number of Northern NGOs are opening offices in the 
South, engaging local organisations as representatives or establishing other forms of physical 
presence. The assumption behind it is that this would make their organisations more efficient and 
effective, being nearer the target group and the partners in the South. However, there are also some 
negative views on the move, which has been referred to as a form of neo-colonialism. The 
strengthening of civil society is a priority for PSO and its member organisations and the main 
justification for its interest in the motivation and impact of field presence of Dutch NGOs on the 
civil societies in the South. 
This report focuses on the crossing of two issues. On the one hand, there is a question on the 
structural design of Dutch NGOs: what is the best way of distributing responsibilities and authorities 
across the organisation in order to achieve its goals? Is it preferable to have a decentralised structure 
with direct field presence or rather to define broad guidelines in The Netherlands and let local 
organisations do the rest? On the other hand, there is the issue of capacity building and the 
development impact in the South. What are the best ways of building capacities and strengthening 
the civil society actors in the South? Is it more effective in terms of impact to be present where the 
action takes place or rather to keep a distance and let civil society actors in the South do their own 
learning?  
These two questions have often been studied separately, leaving a gap to be explored between them. 
At first sight, there seems to be a relationship between the organisational design of Dutch NGOs 
and the extent to which they support the development of capacities in the civil societies in the South. 
This report focuses on the field presence of Dutch NGOs: what motivates their physical presence in 
the South? To what extent does it affect civil societies in the South? In what areas or circumstances is 
there an impact?  
For the sake of this report, direct “field presence” means keeping field offices with a building and an 
administrative structure and/or keeping permanent officers at the site of the projects for 
communication and control purposes (consultants and advisors in the field for a short time are thus 
excluded). A distinction is made between operational NGOs, doing mostly humanitarian work and 
post-conflict rehabilitation, which automatically places them in the category of organisations with 
field offices and officers, and those doing long-term development work, usually through local 
partners.  
It is worth mentioning that every Dutch NGO interviewed for this report uses the term “partners” 
to refer to their counterparts in the South, even if they are just short of subcontractors. In addition, 
all mention doing diverse forms of capacity building with them, from simple training and sharing of 
systematic reporting methods to joint applications for funding and intelligence gathering.  
A total of 29 PSO members have taken part in this report, through face to face or telephone 
interviews with top managers. Unless expressly clarified in the questions, they were asked to reflect 
the views of their organisations rather than their personal opinions. The organisations were selected 
by PSO: all member organisations with some kind of field presence were invited to participate, as 
well as organisations without field presence. Two questionnaires were used, one for NGOs with 
direct field presence in the South and another one for those organisations without direct field 
presence. All questions allowed open answers. In addition, some interviewees were asked for their 
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personal opinions on statements gathered in the literature review which support or reject field 
presence of NNGOs in the South. Finally, two experts were interviewed: Chiku Malunga in Malawi 
and Alan Fowler in South Africa.  
To simplify the reading of this report, a summary has been included at the end of each section 
highlighting the main points and reflections. These are shaded in grey and do not contain 
information that had not been presented in the main text.   
Theoretical background 
In the eighties and early nineties, the international aid chain used to be fairly simple, as depicted in 
the graph below. It used to allocate aid funds from the governments and citizens in the North to 
Northern NGOs (NNGOs) and other private aid agencies, to domestic organisations in the South 
(SNGOs).  The central actor in the network (the one connected to the highest amount of other 
actors) was the NNGOs, as can be seen in the figure below.  
Figure 1 
 
At the turn of the millennium, an identity crisis has taken over the international aid system, as 
reflected in Bebbington et al. (2008) last book’s title “Can NGOs make a difference?”. Far-reaching 
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attempts at reform to improve performance now pervade the system. Public opinion questions the 
legitimacy of NNGOs and their effectiveness in managing the aid resources entrusted to them. One 
result of this change is the priority given to improving NNGO achievement and measurable impact 
through quantitative results (Bebbington et al, 2008: 18). Another result is governments’ and donors’ 
pressures driving a “depolitization” of the NGO sector: instead of agents of change, they are 
retreating to doing service delivery (Rahman, 2006: 435). Equally contested are roles of NNGOs, 
responsibilities, and accountability (Fowler, 2000), particularly in relation to (international) 
governance, advocacy, and civic participation (Edwards, 2000).  
Figure 2 
 
 
The international aid chain has also changed. Bilateral and multilateral agencies now emphasize the 
importance of involving a wider array of non-state actors in development processes to build the 
capacities in the South and achieve sustainable development. Official funding has grown for 
NNGOs favouring the direct financing of local organizations in developing countries (INTRAC, 
1998). In turn, NNGOs take greater account of the differences in country-specific conditions and 
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opened the ‘ownership’ of development policies and processes to those for whom change is intended 
(Beckwith et al., 2002). 
The aid chain is thus integrated by more actors and more relationships, adding complexity to the 
system. Depicted in Figure 2 above is a more current description of the aid chain than the original 
one in Figure 1. This was adapted from Biekart (1999: 91) to highlight that SNGOs have become the 
central actor of the international aid chain (the one with the most connections), at least in theory. In 
practice, this centrality is bypassed when other actors relate to each other directly. Crucially relevant 
for this report is one way of bypassing the centrality of SNGO: when NNGOs have their own field 
presence.  
NNGOs are now pushed to reconsider their position in the aid chain and re-organise their 
structures. Edwards (1996: 4) presented the problem as a tension between “institutional imperatives 
and developmental imperatives – between what the agency thinks it has to do to survive in an 
increasingly difficult environment and what it should be doing to fulfil its mission statement”. On 
the side of institutional imperatives, NNGOs need to show measurable results, efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. They need to align themselves in terms of the needs and interests of their donors. On 
the side of developmental imperatives, NNGOs commit themselves to strengthening the civil 
societies in the South, supporting their emancipation, empowerment and capacity building.  
All of the goals on the side of developmental imperatives are long-term and non-measurable. 
Consequently, Biekart (1999:77) notes, it is non-surprising that NGOs attend their institutional 
imperatives in order to survive and leave developmental imperatives to be served afterwards. While 
doing so they may also downplay the negative consequences of their actions on the goals they wish 
to achieve.  
Decentralisation of the Northern organisations 
The organisational structures adopted by NNGOs reflect this tension between institutional and 
development imperatives. NNGOs are confronted with the decision of decentralising their 
organisational structures to become more effective. That implies setting up multi-country regional 
and national structures, transferring authority and responsibility to them. Alan Fowler (1992, 1999) 
presents the choice in a continuum. The author defines that “an organisation can be said to be 
centralised or decentralised by the degree to which responsibility for and authority over decisions are 
either concentrated at the top or spread downwards within it” (1992: 122).  
The question is not simply to what extent it is best to decentralise across countries by transferring 
responsibilities and authority to the field offices and officers, but there is also a choice to be made on 
the modality in which decentralisation takes place. Fowler (1992: 122) distinguishes three variants. 
The most limited form is deconcentration: responsibilities are moved downwards and outwards within 
the organisation but the distribution of authority does not similarly change. A step further in the 
scale is delegation: both responsibility and authority to make decisions are moved down to lower levels. 
Finally, the most far-reaching type of decentralisation is devolution, in which responsibilities and 
associated authority are transferred to rather autonomous parts of the organisation. In other words, 
the central organisation loses the monopoly to make decisions over certain matters and other bodies 
embrace those functions.  
For development organisations, a critical issue is the geographical distribution of authority across the 
globe. The responsibilities to be undertaken are by definition located in the South, the countries 
where development interventions take place. In turn, decision making powers usually stay in the 
hands of those who provide the funding, the organisations in the North. NNGO define what areas it 
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considers important to work on, what needs to be developed and what is the best method to achieve 
those results. For this, the organisation in the North frequently engages an organisation in the South 
to perform the development intervention. The extent to which SNGO can also take authority 
(ownership) over the development action defines the empowerment and capacity building they 
achieve.  
Capacity building 
Aware of the importance of capacity building for successful development actions, NNGO now make 
efforts to generate ownership among their Southern counterparts, combining the transfer of 
responsibilities and demands for accountability, with some sharing of decision-powers and autonomy 
with SNGOs. This move was greatly influenced by Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, which 
argues for the necessity of going beyond the conventional development targets and taking into 
account improvements in human potential. Development, from this perspective, is fundamentally 
about developing the capabilities of people by increasing the options available to them and their 
freedoms to make their way. Sen turned conventional thinking on development as generating means, 
rather than ends. 
Capacity building for development rests on the principle that investing in the human and social 
capital of marginalised individuals and groups enables them to develop the capacities needed to 
thrive and to play an autonomous role in developing and renewing their communities (Bentley et al, 
2003). Morgan (1998), who has done extensive work on capacity building and contributed to current 
debates and practice, defines capacity as the ‘organisational and technical abilities, relationships and 
values that enable countries, organisations, groups and individuals at any level of society to carry out 
functions and achieve their development objective over time’. 
There is a myriad of definitions and focus on what capacities need to be developed, but definitions 
mostly focus on the need to approach capacity-building efforts from a systems perspective that 
recognises the dynamics and connections among various actors and issues at the different levels, as 
part of a broader unit rather than as loosely connected factors (Baser, 2000). First, there is a clear 
recognition on the need to understand the context in which the capacity-building efforts take place. 
Secondly, emphasis is placed on capacity building at various hierarchical levels (individual, 
organisational, network, sector and the overall enabling environment). Thirdly, to be successful, 
capacity-building efforts must respond to the relationship among these levels, all of which are 
systemically interlinked (Morgan, 2006). The model PSO uses for capacity building is in line with this 
new development in international thinking.  
Capacity-building approaches have focused on improving the leadership, management and/or 
operation of an organisation: the skills and systems that enable an organisation to define its mission, 
to gather and manage relevant resources and, ultimately, to produce the outcomes it seeks. Central 
characteristics of capacity building are empowerment and identity, which result in a collective ability 
to reach a potential state. 
According to the ECDPM, capacity is built on five core systemic capabilities. These are: the 
capability to act, to generate development results, to relate, to adapt and self-renew, and to achieve 
coherence. The capability to act is assessed by the degree to which decisions are implemented, the 
degree and use of operational autonomy, the action orientation within the system, the integrity of the 
organization, its leadership and staff, and its effective human, institutional and financial resource 
mobilization. The second capability, to generate development results, is embodied in the 
strengthening of public institutions and services, the generation of substantive outcomes such as 
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better health and education, and the improvement in the sustainability of development results. The 
third pillar, the capability to relate, is reflected in the degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters 
and stakeholders, the ability to protect the core interests of the system, and the operational 
autonomy. The capability to adapt embeds in an adaptive management culture, the ability and 
discipline to learn, the confidence to change, and the ability to balance stability and change. Finally, 
the capability to integrate needs to solve the tension between the need to specialize and differentiate 
versus the need to bring things together and achieve greater coherence, integrating structures inside 
the system, a well-defined set of rules that govern operations and a shared vision of the intent of the 
organization. These five capabilities are separate but interdependent. (Morgan, 2006) 
Analytical framework 
In short, this report analyses the motivation and impact of field presence of Dutch NGOs in the 
South from four theoretical angles:  
• The move towards the structural decentralisation of development organisations, in the three 
modalities (deconcentration, delegation and devolution) advanced by Fowler (1992, 1999). 
• The changes in the international aid chain generated by the establishment of field presence of 
Dutch NGOs in the South, in the form of direct field offices, officers or exclusive 
partnerships. Thinking on the international aid chain is based on Biekart (1999) and 
Bebbington (2008) 
• The dichotomy between institutional and developmental imperatives outlined by Edwards 
(1996). 
• The five capabilities on which systemic capacity rests on, according to the ECDPM approach 
conceptualised by Morgan (2006): the capability to act, to generate development results, to 
relate, to adapt and self-renew, and to achieve coherence. 
How do Dutch NGOs structure their organisations?  
Amidst the changes in the international aid system, most Dutch NGOs have also been juggling 
between institutional and developmental imperatives. They have to balance a) the need to improve 
the effectiveness of their own organisations and b) the impact on the capacity building of civil 
societies in the South. Some have decided to decentralise their structures and establish field presence 
through their own offices or officers in the South, while others stay operating from The Netherlands.   
This section presents what Dutch NGOs do and what kind of field presence they keep for their 
long-term and humanitarian work. The 29 organisations that participated in the report are grouped 
into five categories: 1) without field presence, 2) with field offices or officers, 3) central partners of a 
network of independent South and North NGOs, 4) members of global NNGOs, and 5) Northern 
partners of SNGO. Each group explains the main reasons for the presence or absence in the field. 
Like all categorisations, the typology presented below also contains some degree of arbitrariness. 
Some organisations structure their interventions in several modalities for different countries or types 
of work. To place them in a certain category, the most common one is given priority.  
1. Dutch NGOs without field presence in the South 
The organisations without field offices in the South are not directly operational outside The 
Netherlands and do mainly structural poverty alleviation and long-term development work. They 
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vary in scale of operations, type of work and time span of their development interventions. What 
they have in common is that they do not have field offices at present as the result of a strategic 
decision of the organisation. All the persons interviewed for this report express their belief that 
having field offices is mostly unnecessary (in part thanks to the new communication technologies) 
and, more than that, it is disrespectful to the civil societies in the South. They consider that field 
presence is detrimental to the development of civil society actors in the South. They acknowledge 
that their absence from the field might lead them to fund projects that eventually do not deliver, but 
they consider this is a risk inherent to all development aid action. 
The sentiment against having permanent field presence is quite strong across all these organisations, 
though for slightly different reasons. For some, it is a matter of principle. One of them expressed: 
“We need to let the South make its own mistakes and learning process. If we or they make a mistake, 
it would not be the first time in the development sector. Let’s consider that the beginning of what is 
today the fair trade scheme was then seen as a failed project. Hindsight shows that there was 
something left, that civil societies in the South built capacities that we did not see immediately then 
but that in the long run gave us a very useful tool to foster development. If they are allowed to do 
their own trial-and error process, there is always something left. Our own Northern presence cannot 
do any better”.  
 
Cordaid Structural development work through and by autonomous local organisations. 
Humanitarian work through field presence. 
CMC Structural development work through and by autonomous local organisations  
NiZA Structural development work through and by long term partners.  
Agriterra Structural development work through and by long term projects and partners 
(3-5 years) 
Edukans Structural development work through and by long term partners. 
SKN Structural development work through and by long term partners.   
To a certain extent, an exception in this group is presented by Cordaid’s humanitarian work 
operations. In some cases of a humanitarian emergency, Cordaid may open an operative field unit 
with local and foreign workers and Dutch funding. However, Cordaid keeps an exit policy of closing 
their humanitarian field offices 2 to 3 years after their opening. This time frame presses the 
temporary field office to do capacity building while attending humanitarian work, knowing it will 
have to support the development of a local organisation to take over. In specific cases in which the 
emergency extends beyond that period, Cordaid created the figure of the “liaison” officers to do only 
technical assistance, support local NGOs and/or subcontract specific needs (e.g. rebuilding houses 
after a war). These are also withdrawn after a certain time. The strategic decision is to let it in the 
hands of the civil societies and governments in the South as soon as possible. 
2. Dutch NGOs with field offices/officers in the South 
While this group is composed of organisations with very different areas of work, scale and sources of 
funding, it is possible to distinguish three sub-categories. 
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2.1 Dutch NGOs in specific areas of capacity building 
The first one is composed of organisations that strongly focus on capacity building in very specific 
areas of knowledge like health and sexual rights or environmental sustainability, to the point that 
their assistance can only be delivered by experts in the field. NSL, SNV, MilieuKontakt, and WPF 
are included in that group. All of these NGOs, however, declare that they make an explicit effort to 
hire as much local staff as possible, with Milieu Kontakt as extreme of hiring local staff exclusively. 
SNV experts claim that “to work with our beneficiaries and be effective in building their capacities, 
person to person contact is necessary. Our being there increases the effectiveness of our organisation 
and our work”. In other words, these organisations consider that their area of expertise is so specific 
and focused that they can only achieve results if delivered to local organisations through their own 
personnel.  
 
NSL Structural development work through partners  
SNV Structural development work through field offices and local organisations.  
Milieu Kontakt Structural development work through field offices and local organisations.  
WPF Structural development work through field offices in some countries and 
local partners managed from The Netherlands in others.  
2.2. Dutch NGOs in post-conflict rehabilitation 
The second group is composed of NGOs that do post-conflict rehabilitation work, often through 
specific psycho-social methods. WarChild, Dorcas and ZOA fall in this category. Although working 
through local organisations is the first choice, it is often impossible to find one doing similar work or 
able to do it after a short period of training. An interviewee explained that “in most post-conflict 
societies the social networks have been decimated by years of fighting, violence, repression and fear 
that, in general, initially prevent people from trusting each other. It takes quite a while for the local 
population to be able to trust each other again to the point of forming their own organisations”.  
As in the previous sub-group, these organisations are active in very specific areas of capacity 
building, delivering skills that local organisations do not have. Nevertheless, the extent to which they 
concentrate their efforts on developing local organisations to take over in the medium term varies 
according to their strategic decisions. Besides, chances of withdrawing depend also on the country, 
type of post-conflict situation in which they operate, and the scars left in the civil society by violence. 
In this sub-group, WarChild stands out for its efforts of withdrawing or at least limiting its influence 
on the civil societies in the South. On the one hand, it has very autonomous field offices, which 
identify needs and projects with their local partners, apply for funds internationally, and are allowed 
to decide on their expenses to a certain limit. Their mandate is to empower local organisations to the 
point that the Dutch managers of some field offices act only as brokers among local NGOs. “We are 
trying to get to a point in which WarChild in The Netherlands will only set some quality standards 
and the field offices decide on all the rest”, the NGO claims. On the other hand, this has led to some 
of the field offices of WarChild becoming legally independent organisations with only local staff. 
There have been two cases of this happening in Eastern Europe. In both, WarChild has called back 
the Dutch directors and left the local managers to continue the work. The main problems 
encountered in this process of “nationalisation” of field offices have been in terms of leadership 
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(people that started at the same level had problems in accepting that some of them were finally 
managing the organisation, so daily work became conflict-laden) and the failure to adapt the 
programme to the changing circumstances of their regions (after the first wave of rehabilitation, the 
incapacity of the organisation to adjust made their work obsolete and the relevance of the 
organisation decreased).  
 
Dorcas Humanitarian and post-conflict rehabilitation 
WarChild Post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction 
ZOA Post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction  
2.3 Dutch NGOs with decentralised structures 
The third sub-group is composed by Dutch NGOs that have gone the furthest in decentralising their 
structures without directly withdrawing their field presence. They are active in a wide spectrum of 
development actions and feel they need their own field presence in the South. However, they are also 
aware of the possible negative impact their decision can have on the empowerment of the civil 
societies in the South. Therefore they have designed decentralised structures that could be described 
by Fowler’s definition of delegation explained above: responsibilities and authorities have been 
transferred to the offices in the South, staffed almost exclusively with local personnel with decision 
powers over the identification of needs and projects, areas of intervention and implementation. At 
the same time, they have neither withdrawn nor have given complete autonomy to their offices in the 
South.  
In the case of ICCO, the re-structuring is ongoing. The functions retained in The Netherlands are 
planned to be restricted to developing a strategic plan, a reporting system and obtaining most funds. 
All other functions will be transferred to the South and ICCO is thus establishing regional offices 
with decision powers in several countries. For example, there are regional offices for Latin America 
and another one for East Africa. These are led by regional councils composed of individuals with 
outstanding knowledge of their civil societies and their development needs (academics, faith-based 
and trade union leaders, entrepreneurs). They are responsible for establishing priorities, defining 
projects, and choosing local partners with their own regional budget. To the question of whether this 
would tamper the ownership expected from civil societies in the South, the interviewee answered 
that “although the general framework for ICCO is still defined in Utrecht, the regional councils will 
have the chance to introduce changes for following strategic plans and if possible also sit at the 
board of ICCO in the Netherlands. This was unthinkable some decades ago, but now the civil 
society actors in the South are strong and mature enough to participate in defining our worldwide 
policy”. If the strategy pursued by ICCO at present is implemented at its full scale, it may become a 
case of devolution and it may pass into the third category of Dutch NGOs to be described below. 
 
ICCO/  
Kerkinactie 
Restructuring since 2005, heading to devolution towards independent 
regional offices. Structural development and humanitarian work  
MCNV  Structural development work (only Vietnam and Laos) with field offices 
and autonomous local partners 
Hivos Structural development work through a small number of autonomous 
regional offices for some countries and management from NL for others 
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Another important characteristic of this sub-group is that the regional offices receive both a lump 
sum of money known to them a couple of years in advance and the freedom –within the mission and 
areas of intervention of the Dutch NGOs- to decide on how to spend it. In HIVOS, for example, 
the budget is informed three years in advance and the regional offices make decisions on how to 
spend it within the guidelines given. The reporting format on how the funds have been used is the 
same across all the regional offices and developed by HIVOS. The business plan for 2007-2010 has 
been submitted in Dutch and after approval has been translated into English. “We are still a Dutch 
NGO and it is important we don’t become an empty shell. Local offices have a lot of freedom within 
the limitations of our bonds. The regional offices resolve for us the creative tension between 
centralization and decentralization”, concluded the interviewee at HIVOS.  
In fact, HIVOS combines organisational forms of intervention. It has a small number of regional 
offices overlooking actions in several countries and at the same time runs projects in other countries 
directly from The Netherlands. Headquarters receive regular reporting on the latter and further 
monitoring is done through visits. There is no evidence at the moment that one system turns better 
results than the other in terms of development impact. 
3. Dutch NGOs with a horizontal network 
This category is formed by smaller Dutch NGOs that have structured horizontal networks with 
long-term partners in the South. They provide only partial funding and technical assistance for 
capacity building, and in this sense SNGOs are considered relatively autonomous entities. “We are an 
important provider of funds for our partners but they have some funds of their own too. They may 
be able to stand on their feet”, explained an interviewee in STRO. That is, relatively autonomous 
SNGO would likely be able to withstand the eventual withdrawal the Dutch NGO, obviously at a 
cost.  
In addition, this group of Dutch NGOs do similar activities at home as the other partners do in the 
South. For example, TIE in Amsterdam gathers information on the workers’ movement in The 
Netherlands, while the Brazilian and Chilean partners do the same in Brazil and Chile respectively, 
and so on. In the case of STRO, the Dutch NGO promotes the use of community currency systems 
worldwide together with its partners in the South in Brazil, Costa Rica, etc. While the work done is 
basically the same for all the members in the STRO network, the Dutch NGO has better access to 
resources and consequently “subsidises” the activities of partners in the South. 
 
STRO Structural development work through long-term strategic local partners 
WEMOS Structural development at health systems’ level, through long-term local 
partners 
Solidaridad Undergoing restructuring since 2007. 
Structural development work and human rights  
ETC Foundation Structural development work through fully independent field offices and  
local partners 
TIE Structural development work mainly in terms of capacity building and 
training with long-term local partner. 
Another characteristic of this group is that the accumulation of knowledge is a crucial interest in 
common for the entire global network. All member NGOs gather and share intelligence, 
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contributing to an expertise that is perhaps the main asset of the whole network. This strengthens 
the organisations in both South and North. For example, TIE’s main asset is the knowledge base on 
the labour movement transnationally, which they use for providing training to trade unions and 
workers around the world and justifies further fund-rising. STRO boasts one of the largest databases 
in the world on experiments with community currency systems worldwide. Naturally, the extent to 
which these organisations feel that their main asset is knowledge varies.  
The picture today roughly corresponds to Fowler’s (1992) devolved type of decentralised structure, 
showing various trajectories. Some SNGOs were never dependent of the NNGOs but developed 
from long-term preferential partnerships. Others decentralised their structures into full-scale 
devolution. ETC has already some experience in a devolved organisational model. In the 1980s it 
decided to create independent offices in the South whose staff was mainly local, with the long-term 
goal of developing local capacity and eventually devolving responsibilities and authorities to the 
South. This was accomplished in 2002, when the offices became legally, managerially and financially 
independent. The network then became the ETC International Group, which collaborates on joint-
proposals, projects, learning and sharing of facilities and is ruled by a membership agreement similar 
to a franchise.  
In turn, Solidaridad represents an example of an organisation that is moving into this category from 
the group of Dutch NGOs without any field presence. Their work in structural development and 
capacity building were done until now from the Netherlands through local partners. It is now 
establishing autonomous regional expertise centres in Latin America, South Africa, East Africa, India 
and China. These are expected to function as independent organisations. The direction of the move 
is significant but its results and implementation modality are still to be seen. 
4. Dutch members of global NNGOs 
All the Dutch NGOs that are members of international networks in the North have a broad 
spectrum of activities in the South, involving humanitarian work (sometimes in post-conflict 
situations) and structural development action. Their very large worldwide networks are formed by 
members and offices spread out in North and South. However, the distribution of power across 
North and South partners varies considerably from one NGO to another. The Red Cross has a 
rather exceptional organisation, explained at the end of this section.  
In general terms, the SNGO partners mostly execute plans defined in the North for the entire global 
organisation. In principle, each one is allowed to do its own fund-rising but in practice most of the 
resources are collected in the North and transferred to the South. This obviously limits the 
autonomy of the field offices in the South, which basically implement plans designed by boards in 
the North. Although they operate locally, they are still mostly seen as foreign agents.  
Some of these Dutch NGOs claim that their function is mainly to provide development services and 
an interviewee suggested: “It is not our task to empower the civil societies in the South in relation to 
their governments, for example”. Most staff in the South is recruited locally and work is done 
through local partners whenever possible. Clearly, not all agree with this position and Oxfam, for 
example, considers it is part of its identity as an organisation “not to keep quite in the face of 
oppressive political situations”.  
In a similar manner, the Dutch members of some of these global organisations are less enthusiastic 
on field presence than other partners in the North. For example, the Dutch Tear Fund does not have 
its own field offices and is more comfortable working through local partners and field officers, but 
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may use the offices of Tear UK if necessary. Oxfam-Novib has withdrawn many field offices in the 
South, while Oxfam UK keeps adding new ones.  
 
CARE Humanitarian and Structural development work through field offices 
and local partners.  
VSO Structural development work through field offices and local partners.  
World Vision Humanitarian and Structural development work through field offices 
and local partners  
Tear Fund NL Humanitarian and Structural development work through local 
independent partners (mostly local churches)  
Oxfam Novib Humanitarian and Structural development work through field offices 
and local partners  
NRK Humanitarian work through RC/RC head-quarters. Structural 
development work through bilateral agreements with members in the 
South.  
 
The degree of autonomy each NGO confers to their field offices in the South also varies; some of 
them are much more than merely implementing offices. In VSO, the headquarters in the North 
define six main programme areas and the country offices decide multiannual strategies and projects 
to implement in line with those. In contrast, Care and World Vision give their field offices barely 
enough independence to make operational decisions.  
A separate case in this group is the Red Cross. It is organised as a federation and the rules state that 
each country member has equal decision powers. Also established in the statues of the global 
RC/RC, no member North is allowed to establish field presence in another country unless expressly 
authorised or requested by the national Red Cross of the recipient country. If there is a humanitarian 
emergence, the request for aid goes through the RC/RC board in Geneva and other country 
members are then asked to step in to do relief work by becoming operational in that country. This 
has been criticised as bureaucratic but to some extent guarantees the autonomy of all members. 
However, there are also parallel provisions for bilateral agreements between member countries and 
these follow the distinct North - South direction that was described for the rest of this category. For 
example, the Dutch and Kenyan Red Cross run structural development projects together, for which 
the Dutch Red Cross has its field office in Nairobi. Though authorised by the recipient country, this 
may undermine its own capacity building. “Some national RC members are more mature than others. 
Where civil societies are strong, they are jealous of their autonomy and limit other members’ field 
offices. In countries with weaker civil societies, the situation is different”, said the interviewee in the 
NRK. The strength of the recipient civil society thus stands out as a critical limitation for field 
offices, a point that is expanded below.  
5. Dutch members of SNGOs 
This last category is, in fact, made of one organisation alone: Amref. It has a relatively similar 
organisational structure as the fourth group, but with the crucial difference that it was started in the 
South, its headquarters remain in the South, and the Dutch office is an offspring in the North of the 
SNGO. This constitutes it into a category of its own. The international aid chain depicted above is 
also not applicable to Amref. 
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As argued by Michael (2004), SNGOs reach maturity when they achieve a certain scale and scope of 
action in and out the borders of the country of origin, accumulated assets, reputation and the 
capacity to redefine the rules of the aid system in the North. In addition, they position themselves in 
such a way that there are none or few substitutes for what they do. Amref is one of the few 
successful examples that fits into the characteristics outlined by the author as a “mature” SNGO. 
None of the SNGOs analysed by that author has transcended to the North in contexts in which 
there were competing organisations doing the same work in the South. 
 
Amref Structural development work through local partners, mainly in health 
care. Kenyan headquarters.  
Summing up: NGOs and field presence 
This section has linked the organisational structures of Dutch NGOs to the kind of work they do 
and/or mission statement they proclaim. These organisations were then categorised in five types, 
which carry some degree of arbitrariness, and are the following: 
1. The first group is composed of NGOs that neither have nor wish to have field offices, either 
because they find it unnecessary or as a matter of principle (they think it is detrimental for the civil 
society actors in the South). 
2. The second one is formed by NGOs with field presence. They show various levels of 
decentralisation, some well into delegation. For others, presence in the South is explained by the 
specificity of the work they do in capacity building, like post-conflict rehabilitation.  
3. The third group is composed of relatively smaller Dutch NGOs that hold long-term strategic 
partnerships in a network of independent North and South NGOs. It roughly corresponds to a 
devolved type of structure, in which each member may stand on its feet on its own. In these 
networks, the joint-accumulation of knowledge is an important source of strength for the entire 
network.  
4. The fourth group is formed by worldwide organisations of which a Dutch NGO is member. They 
work in a wide spectrum of areas, from humanitarian work to structural poverty alleviation. Some of 
them give more autonomy to their field offices and partners in the South than others.  
5. The fifth group is a Dutch NGO that integrates a global network started in the South and with 
headquarters in the South. This is a very rare case of growth and empowerment among SNGOs.  
Motivation for field presence  
The representatives of the 29 Dutch NGOs that participated in this study were asked directly about 
the motivation for the field presence of their organisations. In general, it was found that field 
presence is related mainly to the effectiveness of the NGOs and their accountability to donors, the 
main of which is the Dutch government. In the internal struggle between institutional and 
development imperatives described above, the motivation exposed by the interviewees clearly leans 
towards the former side. This section first analyses the field presence of organisations doing 
humanitarian relief work and subsequently deals with structural poverty alleviation and long-term 
development work.  
Field presence of Dutch NGOs: What is the impact on civil societies in the South? July 2008 19 
Humanitarian & relief work 
For humanitarian aid, field presence allows a quick response and is easier to operate. Even among 
organisations that feel reluctant to establish field presence, there is an explicit recognition that most 
humanitarian work is an exception that requires direct field presence. “Then you can get people, 
resources, prepare a programme and become operative right away, because they are all professionals 
who know what to do and go with enthusiasm. The risk is that once you are there, why bother doing 
capacity building? This is why you need to shift to local organisations immediately after”, said two 
interviewees in the organisations of the first group.  
Among the global NNGOs with field presence (category 4), there is hardly a perception that their 
presence per se affects the civil society in the South. They not only mentioned that being there is 
absolutely necessary but added that it improves their public image and, in this way, allows the 
expansion of their action. “Making our work more visible improves our image and also makes it 
easier to access future funding. Besides, results are easier to report on and more obvious to show to 
donors”, said an interviewee in a global NGO.   
Others considered that a positive image was not so much to secure future funding but to create 
legitimacy: “Southern NGOs are happy to see us get our shoes dirty. They believe it makes us 
understand their situation better. They truly appreciate it and gains acceptance”, explained a 
representative of an NGO doing post-conflict rehabilitation (category 2.2) 
Interviewees generally against field presence were asked to state in what conditions they considered 
that there was no choice but to be in the field. They agreed that it is necessary where there is a very 
weak government (or virtually no government), no infrastructure, and where the social ties that allow 
people to grow trust in each other and their civil society actors have been broken by repression or 
conflict. Examples include Darfour, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other areas undergoing civil wars. A 
second set of circumstances refer to natural disasters and emergency situations that are clearly too 
large for any single state or civil society to be able to respond alone. Examples of this are the 
Tsunami, hurricanes amd earthquakes.  
Fowler also expressed that natural disasters and war are situations that justify starting direct field 
presence but this emergencies do not necessarily define that NGOs need to stay for good. 
Terminating field presence at some point is usually possible and remains an open question to be 
answered by the organisation. When and how should an NGO pull out? When does relief end and 
rehabilitation or eventually structural development start? For the expert, therefore, most field 
presence is ultimately decided by strategic decisions of the NNGO boards, rather than as objective 
responses to external circumstances.  
In other words, in the medium run it is a matter of choice to let local organisations do humanitarian 
relief work. In the short run, although many admit it is preferable, SNGOs are not always ready or 
available. Then NNGOs need to set their own field presence and send their own volunteers, experts, 
and resources. For those reluctant to stay in the field as a matter of principle, there is a clear 
awareness that capacity building needs to take priority soon after the disaster. NNGOs need to 
envision an exit scenario in the medium term in which local organisations can take over (2-3 years). 
Chiku Malunga in Malawi supported the fixing of a period of presence, after which the local partner 
should take over “A partnership that doesn’t specify by when and what has to be achieved does not 
work. In fact, an open-ended partnership to do capacity building loses its target”, he thinks. 
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Structural development work 
Interviewees repeatedly emphasised that their organisations obtained improvements in efficiency by 
maintaining field presence in the South and this was the main reason why they kept a decentralised 
organisational structure. Though not necessarily expressed in the same words, several mentions were 
made to the way in which direct field presence improves the quality of the work, makes it easier, 
quicker, more cost-effective and less conflictive than working with local partners from the 
headquarters in The Netherlands. Specifically, the answers collected are: “it takes less time than 
developing a long term relationship of trust”, “it is faster than building up the capacity of local 
NGOs”, “we can use the same monitoring system across the world and get the information we 
want”, “it is more cost-effective: when you’re there you know the project will run well”, “there are 
less risks of something going wrong because you can support the project directly”, “we avoid the 
problems of the South partners changing leaders or priorities”, and “we make sure the same quality 
standards are met everywhere”. In short, answers centre on the institutional imperatives: field 
presence helps Dutch NGOs to perform better, to achieve results faster and ultimately to survive. 
The first-hand collection of information was second among the most mentioned reasons to justify 
field presence. Interviewees said it allows Dutch NGOs to be better tuned to the local reality and 
closer to local perceptions or needs. However, when asked what type of information they were 
interested in or what they used it for, answers concentrated mostly on data for accountability to 
back-donors (quantitative data on results for reporting, monitoring and evaluation). Qualitative data 
for future identification of needs and projects came second.  
Although not strictly the same, Holvoet at al (2003) made a study in which they compared the 
perceptions and screening in the field offices and in the headquarters of several NNGOs in Brussels. 
They found that the perceptions and evaluations at the headquarters based on reporting from field 
offices and from partner SNGOs were not significantly different. This means that in terms of the 
assessment of development intervention, field presence does not necessarily guarantee a superior 
quality of information. In terms of information to identify needs and future projects, the evidence in 
the study was less conclusive.  
Thirdly, interviewees said that direct field presence improves funding opportunities. Some back 
donors, like the EU and several private foundations directly require field presence of NNGOs in the 
South to allocate funds or give preference to “NGOs we are used to dealing with”. Some said that it 
was costly to keep field presence but access to additional funding made it cost-effective. Most said 
this is not the main reason for their field presence, which responds to a strategic decision but it is a 
welcomed consequence of being in the South. Besides, being in the field reduces the risk of failure, 
which in itself facilitates future funding.  
A few interviewees also mentioned that field presence poses a risk of fragmentation within the 
organisation. That is, the NNGO could lose some of its unified identity and purpose: “Field offices 
sometimes create their own reality. This is in part because they are inserted in different contexts and 
it is good that they are a bit different. Too different becomes a risk”, explained an interviewee. For 
this report, a concern for fragmentation or disunity of field offices was voiced only among NGOs 
with a devolved type of structure. Another author, (McPeak, 2001) analysed how problems arose in 
the restructuring of PLAN, a NNGO that also adopted a devolved type of structure. The author 
concluded that a first wave of decentralisation lead to pressures for a second wave of decentralisation 
which could not be stopped. Still, the author admits that the organisation eventually improved its 
effectiveness.  
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In terms of tensions, interviewees in organisations with devolved structures (category 2.3) also 
mentioned that an important issue is to make it as clear as possible from the start for managers and 
officers in the field what they can and cannot do.  
Both interviewed experts Alan Fowler and Chiku Malunga agreed that Dutch NGOs establish field 
presence seeking efficiency gains. Specifically, they mentioned the goal was to achieve a better 
gathering of local intelligence on which to make decisions. Fowler added that the main advantages 
for the NNGOs are more flexibility, more sensitivity to the development problematic in the South 
and a faster general response capacity.  
While it is clear that field presence increases the effectiveness and efficiency of NNGOs, what do 
Dutch NGOs lose by deciding not to keep field presence? Among the NGOs without field offices 
(first category), two points were raised. The first one focused on the need to make a deep assessment 
of local capacities and eventually make up for the absence of field presence. However difficult, if this 
can be done field presence becomes unnecessary. The second point raised by this group was the 
likelihood of losing funds from donors. While one interviewee said “mistakes happen more often 
when you’re not in the field and this is alright because mistakes lead to learning”, another one 
interviewee admitted that “when you make mistakes you are punished. Donors see you could not 
achieve what you promised and they withdraw their funding. Your partners in the South also suffer 
with that and this needs to be thought in relation to their gains in autonomy when you’re not there”. 
This is not a small point that may justify field presence.  
Finally, interviewees in the first and fourth categories added that the gains in effectiveness from 
having direct field presence are not that clear. Field offices and officers are perceived as a possible 
source of distortions. “Who defined the needs that got us there in the first place? It has to be 
considered that field offices and officers have their own agenda too. What is funded by our 
government is mostly decided by the Dutch embassies under the influence of the lobbying in the 
South of the large NNGOs”, argued an interviewee in this group. 
In summary, there seems to be some consensus that direct field presence is necessary for 
humanitarian relief work because it makes responses faster, more effective and legitimate. However, 
critics of field presence consider that capacity building needs to be given priority as soon as possible 
and for this it is often convenient to foresee an exit scenario in the medium term. In relation to 
structural poverty alleviation and long-term development, opinions are more divided. Field presence 
seems to generate gains in efficiency: Dutch NGOs claim they become more cost-effective, access 
more funding and improve information gathering. Those against it consider that efficiency gains are 
not that clear but even so admit they are more prone to losing funding than those NNGOs with field 
presence. All in all, the motivation for field presence seems more related to the internal needs and 
pressures of the NNGOs and their donors. Extra funding, reporting on measurable and quick 
results, avoiding mistakes, proofs of effectiveness fall on the side of the institutional imperatives.  
Impact on civil societies in the South 
Interviewees were finally asked to assess the impact of the field presence of Dutch NGOs on the 
civil society actors in the South. On the positive side, arguments again concentrate on effectiveness. 
Many claim that direct presence makes capacity building faster, smoother and easier, so it supports 
the development efforts of SNGOs. In this way, civil societies in the South “have only to gain from 
our field presence”, an interviewee claimed. It is almost seen as a short cut to the South’s learning 
process but mainly in terms of the second capability of the ECDPM approach (to generate 
development results) on which capacity building rests.  
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Others relate it to the third capability as well (to relate), as a partnership with a NNGO gives 
SNGOs access to networks in which they normally do not participate. Interviewees saw it as kicking 
the ball rolling to start a virtuous process: “You develop a bond with Southern NGOs. You know 
what has been done and how. You create networks with the government, the private sector, the 
communities and the civil society in which your Southern partners can become integrated and later 
continue. This is a part of the capacity building that you can only do being there”, said an 
interviewee.  
Another perceived positive effect is the opportunity for SNGOs that the NNGOs with which they 
work may turn into role models in terms of organisational capacities, doing advocacy and reporting 
systems. This would affect the capabilities to act, to generate development results and to relate. 
Again, this looks like a shortcut in terms of achieving sustainable development and needs to be 
assessed critically. Instead of building their own organisational models, SNGOs are encouraged to 
adopt imported ones from the North. So while supporting progress in terms of those three 
capabilities, emulating a Northern role model probably undermines furthering the other two 
capabilities, to adapt and to achieve coherence. The reasons are that organisations can rarely renew 
or build up on what they have not developed themselves, while achieving coherence is inherently 
compromised by the fact that the model being emulated is a foreign one, developed in relation to 
different contextual circumstances.  
The list of perceived possible negative effects is quite longer, reflecting that many Dutch NGOs are 
aware that by being in the field they undermine the role of the civil society actors in the South. The 
clearest mechanism, judging by the responses obtained, is that offices of NNGOs introduce extra 
competitors in the local field of SNGOs. In extreme, when a NNGO does structural poverty 
alleviation work, it means the local civil society does not need to organise itself to do it. This leads to 
a delay in building up their capacities. “You are bound to take up the space of a local NGO, this is 
very difficult to avoid. You may keep it from growing or take away funding”, said an interviewee. 
The addition of competitors who are normally more capable relates to the international aid chain 
presented in the analytical section. That is, the field presence of NNGOs in the South takes over part 
of the central role of SNGOs in the aid chain. This point is analysed further in the conclusions. Of 
the five main pillars of capacity building, the capability to relate is the one most affected.  
A second type of negative impact is observed when field presence is established mainly to control 
expenses and push quantitative results on SNGOs. Excessive control and interfere affect all five 
main capabilities at the same time. “It is common human nature that once you are there, you want to 
put your hands into it and control what is being done by your local partners. It is important to 
prevent this”, said an interviewee. Chiku Malunga underlines that at times the NNGO 
representatives interfere because there is insufficient capacity in SNGOs, but argues that this is also 
often used as an excuse. “Rather that ‘you don’t have the capacity’ it is frequently a matter of ‘you 
don’t give us the space’. This idea of partnership is very tricky when your Northern counterpart is 
next to you and it ends in finger-pointing at each other to explain to the NNGO headquarters who 
was responsible for what. It is necessary to work out clearly what the role is for the NNGO 
representatives and keep it to giving support to the local partner”, the expert argued.  
There is also an issue of the real embeddedness of the field presence of Northern NGOs. As put by 
Chiku Malunga: “If you can go home as soon as things go wrong, you are simply more powerful than 
the locals. Those in the South cannot go. So NNGOs cannot have the issues in their blood in the 
same way. Civil society actors in the South have to stay and do something about the situation”, the 
expert said. Indeed, even if some local staff is hired in field offices, Northern NGOs remain mobile 
and, as a result, a foreign agent. 
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A similar reflection is valid in terms of political involvement. As foreign agents, NNGOs should and 
do avoid getting mixed in local politics. At most, some support the building of advocacy capacities. 
This creates a circle: they do not get involved because they are foreigners and precisely this distance 
keeps them foreign. So while undermining the strengthening of capacities among civil society actors 
in the South, the field offices of NNGOs do not fill in that role.  
Some Dutch NGOs emphasised that they hire local staff in their field offices in order to resolve this 
problem. But the consequence is that they also suck human resources from local NGOs. “The 
problem of absorption of capacity from SNGOs is very serious and involves not only the funding 
but mainly the human resources. Working for a NNGO you earn more, have better working 
conditions, and build up your reputation. So the field presence of NNGO not only prevents the civil 
society actors in the South from building up their capacities but regularly drain those that SNGOs 
have built, the qualified human resources that could disseminate knowledge to others”, Malunga 
complained.  
Indeed, several NNGOs interviewed complained of the high wages they had to pay “in order to 
retain the more qualified human resources”. They blamed multilateral organisations such as the 
World Bank and the United Nations for increasing wages beyond a reasonable level. Several Dutch 
NGOs monitor wage levels and claim they pay “a little bit more than the local wages but less than 
the UN”. However, none of them has really been able to find a solution to this problem. For Alan 
Fowler, “it is a problem without a solution. You create a bubble of international wages in a local 
context and inflate the wage market. But what can you do? Otherwise you lose workers”. Wage 
discrepancies have led to a high staff rotation across all field offices. Malunga (2003) calculated that 
in local NGOs in Malawi half their personnel changes in a period of 18 months. In Amref, a local 
player in the South, the estimation did not sound surprising. High staff rotation led by the 
comparatively higher wages paid by NNGOs in the South seriously affects the capacity building of 
SNGOs, especially the capabilities to act, to relate and to achieve internal coherence.  
Finally, there are also ideological reasons against field presence. Some consider it is “simply 
disrespectful” to the civil society in the South to set up presence in their regions. It undermines 
mutual trust and does not really pay off. “The main question is whether you are prepared to listen to 
your partners. If you are, they will give you the information you need and do their own learning 
process. But if you are not, what would you need the information you gather from field presence for? 
How sustainable is development in this way? Not all development work needs to be done close to 
the fire and when you are, you usually compromise ownership”.  
If there are both positive and negative effects, what conditions define which one of these will 
prevail? Alan Fowler argues that the crucial point is not whether there is field presence in the South 
or not, but rather what those offices or officers are doing there. Do they support civil society actors 
in the South or are they implementing themselves what SNGOs should (or could) be doing? If what 
they do is mainly supporting SNGOs, then there will be more positive effects than lost opportunities 
for the civil society actors in the South. If what they do is mainly controlling them, there is a conflict 
with the development imperatives of Dutch NGOs. To make field presence work for both North 
and South actors, there has to be delegation of both responsibilities and authorities and, to the extent 
possible, break the asymmetries of power between field representatives of NNGOs and the SNGO.  
To sum up, Dutch NGOs see both positive and negative effects of field presence on civil societies in 
the South. On the negative side, NNGOs in the South depress the need for local civil society actors 
to organise themselves, grow, and push for social change. Field offices of NNGOs add competitors 
for funding and development intervention. There are also clear risks that field presence may distort 
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the needs’ identification and reinforce the Southern perceptions of inequality. However, field 
presence can become a catalyst for capacity building and reduce a lengthy learning process. In view 
of past experience, it begs the question of whether taking shortcuts is actually possible in the 
development process. 
Conclusions: Which field presence? 
Based on the answers of the interviewees in the 29 Dutch NGOs studied for this report, they were 
first categorised into five groups. The categorisation is obviously arbitrary and does not fully reflect 
the complexity of the work and organisational structure of the Dutch NGOs. It is only used to order 
the analysis.  
The first category is composed of Dutch NGOs with no field presence in the South because they see 
it as a negative move. They are neither convinced of the gains in efficiency nor in information-
gathering attributed to field presence. Instead, they contend that it has a negative impact on the 
capacity building of civil society actors in the South though they also admit their reluctance to move 
South affects their funding opportunities. They are hence giving priority to developmental 
imperatives at the expense of institutional imperatives.  
The second category is formed of Dutch NGOs with field offices. They are convinced that field 
presence makes their work more efficient and effective, and gives them access to better information 
and funding opportunities. However, they also admit their field presence may be disempowering the 
civil society actors in the South. To offset this, some are furthering the decentralisation of their 
structures into delegation or even devolution and refrain from applying for funding or intervening in 
areas where SNGOs are already active. In the scheme presented above, they are giving priority to the 
institutional imperatives above the developmental ones but accompanied with efforts to strike a 
balance and come up with a win-win situation. The restructuring experiment which ICCO is 
undergoing may be a leading case on how to get the best of both worlds, but the final outcome is still 
to be seen.  
The third group is formed by small Dutch NGOs that do not keep field presence directly but 
integrate horizontal networks with strategic partners in the South. With their partners in the South, 
they have achieved a fully devolved organisational structure in which all NGOs in North and South 
are inter-dependent, especially in relation to the joint accumulation of knowledge. In fact, the 
management of information and expertise with the partners in the South seems an optimal method 
of empowerment for them. To achieve this balance, the NNGO should not be too dominant or else 
the SNGO would not be able to develop these strengths. There are some doubts regarding to what 
extent this model would be replicable at a larger scale (i.e. larger organisations) and in development 
interventions in which knowledge is not a critical asset.  
The fourth group is formed of Dutch NGOs that form part of global organisations doing both 
humanitarian and structural poverty alleviation work. A lot of good work has been done in 
humanitarian relief, but a middle-term exit scenario seems the best way of pressing these global 
NNGOs to invest more in local capacity building, to the point of being able to pull out and hand in 
development interventions to the local civil society organisations. For long-term structural poverty 
alleviation work, it seems not enough space is given to local SNGOs. For the Dutch NGOs in this 
category, it seems institutional imperatives are given priority over development imperatives, and 
there is little evidence of change. 
The case of Amref as a sister organisation of a South NGO is the result of the emancipation of the 
civil society in the South seeking the solidarity of the North. It is quite unique and represents a 
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further modification of the international aid chain which may become more common in the future. It 
is a sign that some SNGOs are finally able to reaching maturity.  
For Dutch NGOs, the decision of whether to have field presence in the South lies at the heart of the 
tension between institutional and developmental imperatives, as defined above. According to the 
answers collected, there is some consensus that field presence generates practical efficiency gains, 
raises cost-effectiveness, facilitates access to additional funding, improves reporting and evaluation, 
supports information gathering and furthers the image of NNGOS, especially for those doing 
humanitarian relief work. In the views of the Dutch NGOs with field presence, a decentralised 
structure improves cost-effectiveness in terms of quantitative results, facilitates information gathering 
and increases access to funding.   
In contrast, field presence of NNGOs in the South has negative impacts on the civil society in the 
South. Field presence of NNGOs in the South adds competitors in terms of funding and absorption 
of qualified human resources. In terms of the international aid chain, field offices of NNGOs in the 
South diminish the role of SNGO (compare figure 3 below with figures 1 and 2 in the analytical 
section). In this modified version of the international aid chain, there is no obvious central figure (the 
actor connected to the highest amount of other actors). That role is disputed between the field 
offices of NNGOs and the SNGOs. For the civil societies in the South, the loss of the central role in 
the aid chain affects their decision making powers and prospects for future empowerment.  
For the civil society actors in the South the impact of field presence of NNGOS in the South is most 
likely to be negative. SNGOs will have to face the competition of actors that normally have more 
capacity, better paid human resources, a better organisation, more experience, more lobbying 
capabilities and surely more funding opportunities. These differences reinforce the feeling of 
inequality between North and South actors and reduce the incentives to push for social change in 
their societies. In turn, field presence of NNGOs may be perceived as a disrespectful move, create 
tensions and undermine trust. Field presence of NNGOs disempowers civil societies in the South 
and hinders emancipation.  
Expressed in these terms, field presence would run against most of the development imperatives for 
which Dutch NGOs have been created. It would appear that the positive effects remain within the 
NNGOs and serve their institutional imperatives. In reality, the conclusion is not so clear-cut. On 
the one hand, the efficiency gains of field presence are not straightforward. Dutch NGOs without 
field offices are not always convinced that their efficiency gains offset the negative impact for the 
civil society actors in the South. The little research on the topic is far from conclusive. For example, 
it cannot be stated that field presence generates necessarily better quality of information than regular 
desk reports. On the other hand, the disempowering impact on the civil society in the South is not 
inevitable either. Field presence can be constructive and support civil society actors in the South if 
both responsibilities and authorities are shared. Besides, not having field presence may lead to losses 
of funding that affect SNGOs too.   
The question thus needs to be rephrased: under what conditions does field presence lead to both 
gains in efficiency for NNGOs and capacity building among the civil society actors in the South? 
How can the organisational decentralisation of Dutch NGOs be turned into a win-win situation? 
Good starting points are transferring as many decision powers as possible to local partners, avoiding 
an overburden of controls and interference by field offices, refraining from applying for funds where 
SNGOs are present and pre-defining a medium-run period of field presence. In a nutshell, this 
would mean taking actions in line with the institutional imperatives while respecting the development 
imperatives. It is indeed a thin balance. 
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Part of the answer lies also in not seeing civil society actors in the South as invariably immature and 
weak. In some countries, civil society actors have achieved enough maturity and strength to claim for 
themselves a central role in development interventions. In these countries, SNGOs make the most 
of the field offices of their Northern partners and have turned it into a win-win situation for both 
South and North NGOs. Where the civil society actors in the South are not mature, it is up to 
NNGOs to structure their field presence in such a way that they would contribute to building their 
capacities, giving them enough space and allowing for the mistakes typical of every learning process. 
Figure 3 
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